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We explore the link between liquidity and investment in a an overlapping generation model with a
standard asynchronicity between firms' access to and need for cash. Imperfect pledgeability hinders
the capacity of capital markets to resolve this asynchronicity, resulting in credit rationing and a net
demand for stores of value -- liquidity -- by the corporate sector. At the heart of the model is a distinction
between inside liquidity -- liquidity created within the private sector -- and outside liquidity -- assets
that do not originate in private investment decisions. In the model, outside liquidity comes in two forms:
rents and asset bubbles. We make four contributions. First, we show that imperfect pledgeability severs
the link between dynamic efficiency and the level of the interest rate. Bubbles are possible even when
the economy is dynamically efficient. Second, we demonstrate that the link between outside liquidity
and investment is ambiguous: on the one hand, outside liquidity eases the asynchronicity problem
of firms, boosting investment -- the liquidity effect; on the other hand it competes with inside liquidity,
reduces the value of firms' collateral and lowers investment -- the competition effect. We characterize
precisely the conditions under which outside liquidity and investment are complements or substitutes.
Third, we explore the possibility of stochastic bubbles. We show that they trade at a liquidity discount.
Bubble bursts can be endogenously triggered by bad shocks to corporate balance sheets and have potentially
amplified effects on investment through liquidity dry-ups. Fourth, in an extension where corporate
governance is endogenously determined by a trade-off striked by firms between collateral and value,










Bureau MF529 - Bat. F




Intuition and classic growth theory both suggest that stores of value and asset bubbles
raise interest rates and crowd out productive investment. While the interest rate response
is rather undisputed, the competition eﬀect does not seem to capture the entire investment
story in some famous episodes. Japan’s bubble came with not only high interest rates
but also vigorous investment and growth; when it burst, the country went through a
prolonged deﬂation and recession. Similarly, in the US stores of values do not seem to
have hampered productive investment when the public debt rose sharply during the 1980s,
or during the Internet bubble; interest rates1 and investment fell when the latter burst.
This paper provides a new and richer view on how rational bubbles impact eco-
nomic activity. It builds on the idea that bubbles augment the stock of stores of value
that ﬁrms can use as liquid instruments to ﬁnance their future investments. As such,
bubbles are complements to productive capital.
In order to introduce a corporate demand for liquidity, its framework embod-
ies a standard asynchronicity between ﬁrms’ access to and need for cash. While this
asynchronicity is perfectly resolved by capital markets in classic growth theory, capital
markets are here imperfect in the tradition of corporate ﬁnance: Factors such as agency
costs prevent entrepreneurs from pledging the entirety of the beneﬁts from investment to
investors, resulting in credit rationing.
More precisely, the model has overlapping generations of entrepreneurs. Entre-
preneurs have some wealth when young, which they need to save for the investment
opportunities that they will encounter when middle aged. Investment pays oﬀ when old
(i.e., in the third period of their life). To transfer wealth between the ﬁrst two periods of
their life, the entrepreneurs can avail themselves of three stores of value: an exogenous
ﬂow of short term rents that produce output in the future; securities issued by previous
generations of entrepreneurs’ ﬁrms and therefore backed by the pledgeable income on
past investments; and asset bubbles. Thus and a novel feature of our modeling, previ-
ous investment creates stores of values that new investment can build on, and so even a
bubbleless economy exhibits path dependency.
We provide several examples of such “rents”. In the ﬁrst illustration, the state takes
advantage of its regalian taxation power, and issues Treasury bonds backed by the con-
1For example, the Fed funds rate fell from 6,5% in July 2000 to 1% in April 2004.
2sumers’ future income. In the second, reverse mortgages allow consumers to borrow
against their future income; this securitization of their housing assets increases the num-
ber of stores of value that ﬁrms can invest in. Finally, we introduce a sector of ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms such as depicted in standard investment theory); these
ﬁrms securitize the entirety of the future income associated with their current invest-
ment. In all cases, a ﬂow of stores of values is created by the “unconstrained sector”, that
the constrained sector can build on to meet liquidity needs.
Our results can be grasped from the following insight. Firms both consume and
produce stores of value. The impact of outside liquidity on investment and economic
activity accordingly hinges on the relative potency of two eﬀects: a liquidity eﬀect and a
competition eﬀect.
On the consumption side, the ﬁrms’ hoarding of liquid assets makes them beneﬁtf r o m
an increase in the supply, and a reduction in the price of liquid assets. This investment-
enhancing liquidity eﬀect operates only when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained.
On the production side, their issuing securities on the capital market to ﬁnance liquid-
ity needs makes them vulnerable to high interest rate conditions. An increase in outside
liquidity raises interest rates and competes with the securities issued by the ﬁrms.
We are now equipped to enunciate and provide intuition for the main results:
Crowding in or out? Consider ﬁrst the impact of a ﬂow of rents on investment. Rents
are purchased as stores of value by ﬁrms, but they also compete with the latter’s security
oﬀerings. The competition eﬀect is stronger when the investment multiplier is low. This
happens when outside liquidity is scarce and when inside liquidity is neither too low
nor too high. When this is the case, the competition eﬀect dominates and rents crowd
investment out. When this is not the case, the liquidity eﬀect dominates and rents crowd
investment in.
The results are sharper for bubbles. A bubble, except at its inception, always crowds
investment in as long as ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained and are net demanders of stores
of value. Bubbles increase the interest rate and induce a transfer of net worth from lenders
to borrowers. When the unconstrained sector is a net supplier of stores of values, bubbles
crowd investment in the ﬁnancially constrained sector in.2
2In a more general model where some ﬁrms are not ﬁnancially constrained and some consumers
undertake investments (housing, education etc.), bubbles redistribute net worth away from net suppliers
of assets, and correspondingly reduce their investments while boosting the net worth and investments of
other agents .
3Cross-section implications. Outside liquidity impacts ﬁrms diﬀerently: Firms with
limited ability to pledge future cash-ﬂows (family and private equity ﬁrms, start ups) are
not or little hit by competing claims as they issue no or few securities. Accordingly, they
beneﬁt more from a bubble, and beneﬁt more from (or are less hurt by) an increase in
the amount of rents.
Existence of bubbles. Because they are demanded as stores of value, bubbles are more
likely to exist when inside and outside liquidity are scarce. Equivalently they are more
likely to exist when interest rates are low.
The paper obtains three other insights.
Dynamic eﬃciency. Standard tests for the possibility of bubbles are ill suited for our
environment. With imperfect capital markets, the economy can be dynamically eﬃcient
while the interest rate is lower than the growth rate of the economy. This is because the
rate of return on internal funds exceeds that on borrowed ones; therefore the social rate
of return on investments is higher than the market interest rate when returns can only be
imperfecly collateralized — a result reminiscent of Saint-Paul (1992). Hence bubbles can
exist even when the economy is dynamically eﬃcient.
Bubbles and corporate governance. We study how bubbles aﬀects the corporate gover-
nance choices of ﬁrms. If ﬁrms are confronted with a tradeoﬀ between pledgeability and
value, then states of scarce liquidity and low interest rates will lead ﬁrms to sacriﬁce value
in order to boost collateral. Bubbles increase liquidity, lower the equity multiplier and
lead ﬁrms to loosen corporate governance by forgoing pledgeability for value.
Bubbly liquidity discount. We examine the possibility of stochastic bubbles — bubbles
that can burst. Bubble bursts are accompanied by low interest rates and high equity
multipliers. Because stochastic bubbles pay oﬀ only in states of the world where equity
multipliers are low, they command a liquidity discount — they have higher expected re-
turns. We show that bad shocks hitting ﬁrms’ balance sheets reduce the demand for
liquidity and lead endogenously to bubble bursts. Bad shocks to corporate balance sheets
can potentially have an ampliﬁed eﬀect on investment over and above that described in
the literature emphasizing the importance of corporate net worth — for example Kiyotaki-
Moore (1997) — by triggering liquidity dry-ups in the form of bubble bursts.
Outline of the paper. The paper proceed as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and
describes the solution when there are no bubbles. It characterizes its unique steady state
4and derives some key comparative statics results. Section 3 introduces the possibility
of rational asset price bubbles. It explicits the dynamics with bubbles, describes the
properties of the unique bubbly steady state and analyzes how bubbles aﬀect corporate
governance choices of ﬁrms. Section 4 introduces stochastic bubbles and derives the
mechanics of a bubbly boom-bust episode. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results
in several variants of the model, and Section 6 summarizes the main insights and discusses
alleys for research.
Relationship to the literature
The paper builds on a number of contributions. Most obviously, it brings together
the literature on (rational) bubbles and that on aggregate liquidity, hence its title. The
competition eﬀect dates back to at least Diamond (1965)’s celebrated analysis of national
debt, and is prominent in the theory of rational bubbles (Tirole 1985). Indeed, the two
standard criticisms of the latter theory are that it predicts a crowding out of investment
by bubbles ("crowding-out critique") and that bubbles can exist only if the productive
sector consumes more resources than it delivers (i.e., only if the economy is dynami-
cally ineﬃcient), which is empirically debatable (Abel et al. 1989’s "dynamic eﬃciency
critique").This paper shows that these two concerns disappear under imperfect capital
markets.
T h er o l eo fs t o r e so fv a l u e si ns u p p o r t i n gi n v e s t m e n tw h e ni n c o m ei sn o tf u l l yp l e d g e -
able has been stressed for example by Woodford (1990) and Holmström-Tirole (1998).
In Woodford’s contribution, ﬁrms are net lenders and there is always a need for (and a
potential shortage of) stores of value. Woodford assumes away the competition eﬀect by
positing that none of the future cash ﬂow is pledgeable to investors and so ﬁrms do not
issue securities. By contrast, ﬁrms in Holmström-Tirole are net borrowers, and shortages
of liquidity are associated with adverse macroeconomic shocks. Holmström and Tirole also
assume away the competition eﬀect, but for a diﬀerent reason: In their model, security
issues never compete with liquidity that issuing ﬁr m sh a v en ou s ef o r ,u n l i k ei nt h i sp a -
per. This paper takes the Woodford approach for illustrative purposes. Saint-Paul (2005)
shows that government debt (a store of value), while deterring capital accumulation, can
increase the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial sector. Entrepreneurs can buy public debt and use it
as collateral. The existence of collateral reduces agency costs (Saint-Paul uses the costly-
state-veriﬁcation model as an illustration). Accordingly, public debt boosts growth over
a range of parameters.
5The paper shares with Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) the idea that investment decisions
are intertemporal complements. In Kiyotaki-Moore, tomorrow’s investment will raise the
price of the store of value, which is used as an input in the production process; this future
increase in the price of the store of value raises the ﬁrms’ wealth and thereby today’s
investment. In our paper, it is yesterday’s investment that supports today’s investment,
by creating securities that ﬁrms can hoard to meet their liquidity needs. Also, Kiyotaki-
Moore’s focus is rather diﬀerent as it has no bubbles and does not emphasize the eﬃciency
test.
The rational bubble literature has addressed the crowding-out critique in alterna-
tive ways. Bubbles are attached to investment in Olivier (2000) and to entrepreneurship
in Ventura (2003), generating an incentive and a wealth eﬀect respectively; in both papers,
bubbles can crowd investment in. Saint-Paul (1992) addresses the dynamic-eﬃciency cri-
tique by studying an endogenous growth model with bubbles, in which the social return
on investment exceeds the private return due to spillovers. The long-term rate of interest
can then be smaller than the rate of growth of the economy, and yet the economy be dy-
namically eﬃcient. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) develop a theory of bubbles in
emerging markets. They introduce, as we do, an investment driven demand for liquidity
and show in the presence of fragile (stochastic) bubbles, the economy overinvests in the
bubbly asset and is overexposed to bubble crashes due to a pecuniary externality.
Our paper sheds some light on the debate as to whether monetary authorities
should try to lean against bubbles (or, in a more extreme form, try to make them pop)
by raising interest rates or denying access to the discount window to banks that extend too
many loans. Some scholars (Bernanke 2002, Bernanke-Gertler 2000, 2001, Gilchrist-Leahy
2002) argue that the central bank should not pay attention to asset prices unless these
signal future inﬂation; others (Bordo-Jeanne 2002) are in favor of a moderate reaction. All
concur that a restrictive policy leads to a lower output and a signiﬁcant risk of collateral
– induced credit crunch. Our model is consistent with this premise, as the pricking of
the bubble leads to a collateral shortage and reduced investment and production.
2 The Bubbleless Economy
62.1 Model set-up
Consider a single good overlapping generation model with a growing population of risk-
neutral entrepreneurs and consumers. The population growth rate is 1+n. Entrepreneurs
live for three periods: young, middle age and old. Consumers live for only two periods:
young and old.
In addition to investment projects carried out by entrepreneurs, there are l unit of
rents in period t.R e n t sa td a t et are short-term real bonds, paying one unit of good at
date t + 1.L e trt denote the interest rate between dates t and t + 1.
When young, entrepreneurs are endowed with A units of good (wealth) and (1 − θ)l
unit of rents per capita. When middle aged, they can invest it to get ρ1it when old.
However, only a fraction ρ0it < ρ1it of the return on investment is pledgeable. In equilib-
rium, it will always be the case that ρ0 <1+rt+1 so that ﬁrms can only partially rely on
outside ﬁnancing at the investment stage. Throughout the paper, we consider only the
regime where entrepreneurs are constrained in their investment. In Section 5.1 we relax
this assumption and introduce an unconstrained corporate sector.
Assumption 1 (ﬁnancially constrained regime) ρ1 >1+ rt+1 and 1 + n>ρ0. 3
T h er e s to ft h er e n t sθl is owned by consumers who are not entrepreneurs. Until
Section 3.4, we assume that θ ∈ [0,1]. In Section 3.4, we allow for θ <0and analyze in
detail the consequences of this important assumption.
In their youth, entrepreneurs of generation t must decide how much additional bonds
^ lt to purchase, and how much to invest xt in projects of entrepreneurs of generation t−1
realized in period t and delivering output in period t + 1.
To begin with, we assume that entrepreneurs can only consume when old, and that
consumers can only consume when young. Later in Section 5 we will allow for less extreme
preferences: linear or concave utilities with per period discount factor β.W e t h e r e b y
ignore in a ﬁrst step the possibility that consumers save part of their endowment and
ensure that entrepreneurs save theirs and invest it in productive assets. Consumers of
generation t therefore sell their rents θl to the entrepreneurs of generation t.
3In a linear model such as ours, when outside liquidity is too abundant, the interest rate 1+rt+1 rises
above ρ1 and entrepreneurs abandon their productive investment projects. Instead they hoard outside
liquidity in order to ﬁnance consumption in the last period of their life.
7Entrepreneurs invest all their wealth in their youth in stores of values — rents and
investment projects of the previous generation — and use these savings when middle-aged





At date t + 1, the date-t agent’s borrowing capacity is the sum of the value of claims
on future income, ρ0it/[1+rt+1], the yield on hoarded rents b lt +(1−θ)l, and the return,




+[ ^ lt +( 1 − θ)l]+( 1 + rt)xt.
Market clearing therefore requires
^ lt = θl and xt =
ρ0it−1
(1 + n)(1 + rt)
.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
The economy can be described recursively with one state variable: past investment it−1.
At date t+1, given past investment it−1, current investment it and the interest rate rt+1
are jointly determined by the intersection of a supply and a demand equation for assets.
That these two curves intersect is the condition for the market of stores of value to clear
at date t + 1. The demand equation is independent of it−1. The supply equation on the
other hand depends on past investment it−1, which determines the liquidity available for
current investment. Hence liquidity imparts a path dependency to the economy.
Asset supply equation. The supply equation describes how generation t’s in-
vestment at date t + 1 is constrained by the available liquidity, l+
ρ0it−1




















with ∂is(it−1,r t+1)/∂rt+1 <0 .
Asset demand equation. The demand equation says that generation t+1’s wealth
goes into buying liquidity from the consumers (θl) and that generated by the previous
generation’s investment (ρ0it/(1 + n)):









[A(1 + rt+1) − θl]
with ∂id(rt+1)/∂rt+1 >0 .
We deﬁne a competitive equilibrium as a sequence of investment levels and interest
rates {it,r t} such that at every date t, the asset market clears:
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence {it,r t}t≥0 together with an initial
investment level i−1 ≥ 0 such that the asset supply and asset demand equations (1) and
(2) hold and for all t ≥ 0, it ≥ 0 and 1 + rt >0 .
The asset market clears at date t+1 when the demand and the supply curves intersect,











We derive the exact solution for investment dynamics — it as a function of it−1— in appendix
A1.4
4As i m p l ec a s ei sθ = 0. In that case, the system can be solved in closed form:
1 + rt+1 =
ρ0
³









9Conditions (1) and (2) imply that the productive sector provides its own liquidity in
a dynamic fashion: an increase in it−1, using (1), leads to an increase in it (and in rt+1,
which from (2), must then co-vary with it).
An increase in the pledgeability parameter ρ0 shifts the asset demand curve upwards
and the asset demand curve downwards. This increases the interest rate and has an am-
biguous eﬀect on investment it: we can only say for sure that total pldegeable income ρ0it
increases. Note also that as is standard from the corporate ﬁnance literature, investment
increases with the entrepreneurs’ wealth A: higher net worth pushes the demand curve
upwards, decreasing the interest rate rt+1 and increasing investment it.
By contrast, the rate of growth of the economy, n, impacts investment in two opposite
ways. On the one hand, the current generation builds on a smaller amount of per-capita
liquidity provided by the previous generation. On the other hand, the collateral that the
current generation will create will be more valuable as the next generation’s savings will
be abundant and will be used to purchase stores of value. Interestingly, none of these
eﬀects would exist in a neo-classical model; here the marginal productivity of investment,
ρ1, is constant and so in the absence of credit constraints, per-capita investment would
not depend on the rate of growth of the economy.
The asset supply and asset demand equations (1) and (2) can also be used the de-
termine the impact how outside liquidity — that is, rents l — impacts investment. The
impact of an increase in the level of rents l can be decomposed into two eﬀects. On the
one hand, increasing rents available at date t shifts the asset supply curve (1) upwards,
raising investment it for all interest rate levels rt+1—aliquidity eﬀect. On the other hand,
increasing rents available at date t+1 shifts the asset demand curve downwards, lowering
investment it for all interest rate levels rt+1—acompetition eﬀect. The interest rate rt+1
unambiguously increases, but the resulting eﬀect on investment it at date t + 1 is am-
biguous. Firms demand liquidity which is akin to an input in production. This tends to
make investment and outside liquidity complements. But investments made by the private
sector also play the role of inside liquidity. Inside liquidity is in direct competition with
outside liquidity. This tends to make investment and outside liquidity complements. This
distinction between the liquidity eﬀect and the competition eﬀect also has a temporal di-
mension. Past liquidity — inside liquidity it−1 or outside liquidity — and contemporaneaous
investment it are complements. Future liquidity and contemporaneous investment it are





The basic model has a unique steady state determined by the unique intersection with















In appendix A1, we solve for i∗ and r∗ in closed form.5 As will become clear when we
compute the dynamics for investment in section 3, this equilibrium is stable.
Increasing outside liquidity (l) or collateral (ρ0) shifts the supply curve upwards and
the demand curve downwards. Therefore, the interest rate r∗ increases with l and ρ0.
How investment i∗ varies with outside liquidity l and collateral ρ0 however, is a priori
ambiguous. More rents, or more collateral are good news for investors demanding liquidity
— the liquidity eﬀect—, but bad news for those supplying it— the competition eﬀect— as it
introduces competition for their stores of values, depresses their price, and hence reduces
their net worth. When θ <1 ,there is also a wealth eﬀect since increasing l increases
the net worth of entrepreneurs, which increases investment. In other words whether
outside liquidity or rents are complements or substitutes with investment is ambiguous
and depends on whether the liquidity eﬀect and the wealth eﬀect are stronger or weaker
than the competition eﬀect.
2.4 Rents and investment
In this section, we ﬁnd conditions under which outside liquidity increases investment. In
the model the amount of rents l parametrizes the level of outside liquidity in the economy.
It is useful to ﬂesh out the concept of liquidity however. In our view, l can typically come
from consumer leverage and securitization or be provided by the state in the form of
public debt as in Woodford (1990).











112.4.1 What rents are: some microfoundations
Public supply of liquidity. A ﬁrst microfoundation for rents l goes as follows (state
provided liquidity): consumers live for one period, receive income w at home or abroad.
They incur a cost ˜ l<wif they move abroad. So the state can tax them ˜ l. The state
issues bonds one period ahead. Let π be the number of newly born consumers per newly
born entrepreneur and deﬁne l ≡ ˜ lπ(1 + n). The state receives l/(1+rt) from the bond
issuance and distributes it to consumers and ﬁrms in proportion (θ,1− θ).N o t e t h a t
individual consumers live for a single period. Individually, they are neither lenders nor
borrowers. Collectively, though, they are net borrowers as the state issues "on their
behalf" pledges on their future income.
A private-sector variant of this would have private lenders, who subsidize consumption
when young of two-period lived consumers up to a reimbursement limit of l as consumers
can move abroad in the second period of their life. This model is isomorphic to the one
with public supply just outlined with the additional constraint that θ = 1.
Securitization. Alternatively, we could suppose that consumers have some endow-
ment of goods w — labor income — in their youth. They use that labor income to build a
house, which has total value y1jt at period t+1, where jt is the home investment realized
in period t. The house might have some private value on top of its rental value. Suppose
ﬁr s tt h a to n l yt h er e n t a lv a l u ey0jt <y 1jt can be securitized today. Consumers can in-










values for the corporate sector. In that model, we implicitly have θ = 1. An increase in
securitization — in the form of mortgage backed securities for example — can be formalized
as an increase in y0 towards y1 and materializes as an increase in lt. A feature of this
microfoundation is that the amount of rents lt is endogenous as it is aﬀected by the level
of interest rates (we generalize the analysis to interest-dependent rents in Section 5.1).
Consumers as borrowers. We will also analyze a less extreme case where consumers
have concave preferences and hence an elastic borrowing margin. They live for two periods
a n dh a v ep r e f e r e n c e sg i v e nb y
u(cy)+βu(co)
where cy and co denote respectively consumption when young and old. They earn income
wy when young and wo when old. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the case of log













((1 + rt)wy + wo)
The supply of rents from the consumers’ sector is therefore
lt = l(rt) ≡ wo −
β
1 + β
((1 + rt)wy + wo)
where l(rt) is decreasing with rt. We analyze this setup in greater detail in Section 5.1.
Unconstrained ﬁrms. Suppose that there also exists a competitive fringe of ﬁrms
operating a concave production function f(kt). These ﬁrms are owned by consumers who
only consume when young. Consumers then sell the ﬁrms to investors for a price f(kt)/(1+
rt) − kt where kt is the equilibrium investment level. In equilibrium, it will be the case
that f0 (kt)=1 + rt so that kt = k(rt) where k is decreasing in rt. The model is then
nested by the one described in the above paragraph with l(rt)=f(k(rt)).
2.4.2 The horserace between the liquidity eﬀect, the wealth eﬀect and the
competition eﬀect
Let us clarify under which circumstances outside liquidity (rents) and investment are
complements or substitutes in steady states. Note ﬁr s tt h a ti fA s s u m p t i o n1 does not
hold, then our characterization of the steady state is invalid. This happens when liquidity
l is so high that the interest rate 1+rt+1 exceeds the rate of return on productive projects
ρ1. Entrepreneurs then give up entirely on their investment projects and instead hoard
outside liquidity to ﬁnance consumption when old. Investment is completely crowded out
and liquidity is not valued.
In this paper, we are chieﬂy interested in the regime where liquidity is scarce and As-
sumption 1 holds. We start with a simple case, θ = 1, which has the virtue of neutralizing







13This expression shows that i∗ increases in r∗ and therefore in l if and only if
1>
2ρ0
1 + r∗ (4)
and decreases otherwise. Moreover, one can show that
2ρ0
1+r∗ is non-monotonic in ρ0 :
increasing then decreasing. In addition, if
ρ0
1+n ≥ 1
2, then (4) is automatically veriﬁed for
all l ≥ 0.
Hence there are generally two regions (one of them might not exist). For l low enough,
r∗ is low and condition (4) is violated: in this region i∗ decreases with l. For l high enough,
r∗ is high and condition (4) holds: in this region, i∗ increases with l. This suggests that l
and i∗ are substitutes at low levels of stores of values and complements at higher levels of
stores of values. When outside liquidity is scarce, the competition eﬀect dominates and
investment decreases with liquidity. By contrast, when outside liquidity is abundant, the
liquidity eﬀect dominates and investment increases with liquidity.
This can be understood as follows. Increasing l increases liquidity and therefore de-
creases the price of liquidity by increasing the interest rate r∗. A higher interest rate r∗
on the one hand increases the return on savings and therefore the total net worth of
entrepreneurs at the date of investment A(1 + r∗), a n do nt h eo t h e rh a n dr e d u c e st h e





¢−1 . The latter eﬀect
is stronger when
ρ0
1+r∗ is high. When l is high then the interest rate is high,
ρ0
1+r∗ is low
and the former eﬀect dominates.
It can be shown that
ρ0
1+r∗ is non monotonic in ρ0 : ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing.
T h ei n v e s t m e n tm u l t i p l i e ri sn o tv e r ys e n s i t i v et ot h ei n t e r e s tr a t er∗ both for low and
high values of ρ0. Therefore, (4) is more likely to be violated for intermediate values of
ρ0. W h e nt h e r ei sn oi n s i d el i q u i d i t y( ρ0 = 0), then there is no collateral, the investment
mutliplier is equal to 1 and the latter eﬀect vanishes so that investment i∗ increases with




and the investment mutliplier does not vary much with l. As a result, investment i∗ also











∂  < 0
∂i
∗




Proposition 1 In the bubbleless economy, steady state per capita investment i∗
(i) grows with the fraction of rents owned by the entrepreneurs (1 − θ),
( i i ) m a yi n c r e a s eo rd e c r e a s ew i t ht h er a t eo fg r o w t ho ft h ee c o n o m y( n) and with pledge-
able income (ρ0),
(iii) when inside liquidity is plentiful (
ρ0
1+n ≥ θ
1+θ), and so when interest rates are high,
grows with outside liquidity ( l ),
(iv) when inside liquidity is scarce (
ρ0
1+n ≤ θ
1+θ), grows (decreases) with outside liquidity
( l ) when inside liquidity is plentiful (scarce), and so when interest rates are high (low).





∂l <0for l ∈ [0,l0) and
∂i∗
∂l >0for l ∈ (l0,+∞)6. Moreover, l0 is non-monotonic in
ρ0







The intuitions behind (iii) and (iv) are very similar to the ones we developed for the
case θ = 1. This can be understod most clearly by noting that
i
∗ =































15Note also that inside liquidity ρ0i∗ always increases with pledgeable income ρ0. It might be
the case, however, that i∗ decreases with ρ0 : on the one hand, for a given level of demand
for liquidity A(1 + r∗)=
ρ0
1+ni∗ + θl, a higher level of pledgeable income ρ0 decreases
investment i∗; on the other hand, r∗ increases with ρ0 and the net eﬀect is ambiguous.
3 Bubbles
Let us now allow for the possibility of bubbles.
3.1 Competitive equilibrium and steady state
Let bt be the size of the bubble per capita. By convention, bt i st h eb u b b l ea td a t e
t+1 per entrepreneur of generation t. Bubbles aﬀect both the asset supply and the asset
demand equations. We modify our deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium accordingly.
Deﬁnition 2 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence {it,b t,r t}t≥0 together with an initial
investment level i−1 ≥ 0 such that the asset supply and asset demand equations (5) and
(6) deﬁned below hold and for all t ≥ 0, it ≥ 0, bt ≥ 0 and 1 + rt >0 .
The economy can now be described recursively with two state variables: it−1 and bt.
The supply equation becomes
it = i
s(it−1,r t+1;bt) ≡







with ∂is(it−1,r t+1;bt)/∂rt+1 <0 .









with ∂id(rt+1;bt)/∂rt+1 >0 .
The bubble shifts the supply curve up and the demand curve down. Therefore it
unambiguously increases the interest rate, but has an ap r i o r iambiguous eﬀect on invest-
ment. In Proposition 2, we will resolve this ambiguity and show that bubbles increase
current and future investment.
16Bubbly steady state. There exists either zero or a unique steady state with bubbles.
When it exists it is given by
i
∗∗ =


















(1 − θ)l + A(1 + n)
denote the ratio of outside liquidity over corporate wealth, or “outside liquidity ratio” for








Condition (B) shows that bubbles can emerge when inside (ρ0) and outside (Λ) liquidity
are scarce, creating a high demand for stores of value. Note also that in a bubbly steady
state, the interest rate is pinned down at n. The analysis of the phase diagram below
shows that condition (B) is equivalent to the standard condition that the interest rate in
the bubbleless steady state r∗ be less than n.
When θ = 1, variations in l are compensated one for one with variations in the size
of the bubble: the number of stores of values is invariant to l. When θ <1on the other
hand, rents have a positive wealth eﬀect on entrepreneurs and as a result, investment
increases with l. The bubble only partially crowds out rents, and the number of stores of
value increases with l.
Investment dynamics. One can eliminate the rate of interest and rewrite generation-
t’s investment as a function of the previous generation’s investment and the bubble:













Lemma 1 Investment it is an increasing function of it−1 and bt.
17The economy is a two-dimensional dynamic system that can be described conveniently
with a phase diagram. This requires charactering it = it−1 schedule and the bt+1 = bt


















This deﬁnes the schedule as a function bt of it−1: bi
t(it−1).












[A(1 + n)+( 1 − θ)l] − l










[A(1 + n)+( 1 − θ)l]−l which is strictly
positive as long as (B) holds. It is easy to verify that bi





dit−1 |it−1=0 on the other hand, is unclear a priori. Note that the bubbleless
steady state is always stable.
When θl = 0, the bubble has no impact on investment. The bubble just increases the
interest rate but does not have any impact on the dynamics of investment. When θl>0
on the other hand, the bubble increases investment along the path to the bubbly steady
state and at the steady state.
While the bubble, like the rents, acts as a store of value, it does not have their
ambiguous impact on investment. To understand this, consider, ﬁrst, the direct eﬀect of
a bubble, a 1-for-1 crowding out of the value of securities issued by entrepreneurs: the
total source of liquidity for entrepreneurs is bt + l +
ρ0it
1+rt+1 , of which the bubble bt and
the securities
ρ0it
1+rt+1 are sold to the next generation of entrepreneurs. Put diﬀerently,
only the sum bt +
ρ0it
1+rt+1 enters the supply and demand equations. The presence of the
bubble therefore increases the rate of interest. This increase in the interest rate lowers
the value of the rents. Thus when entrepreneurs buy rents from consumers (θ >0 ), in
the competition for savings between the two sources of liquidity owned by entrepreneurs
(bubble, securities to be issued) and the one held by consumers (rents), the increase in
interest rate beneﬁts the liquidity held by entrepreneurs and therefore crowds investment
in.
18Figure 2 is a phase diagram representing the dynamics of the economy. Note that the
bubbly steady state always features more investment than the bubbleless steady state. It
features a downward sloping saddle path. If the economy starts on the saddle path, it
will eventually converge to the bubbly steady state. If it starts below the saddle path, it
will eventually converge to the bubbleless steady state. The economy cannot start above
the saddle path without eventually violating one of the constraints.
We are now in position to describe the dynamics when a bubble pops up. Suppose
for example that we are in the steady state without bubbles. As the bubble pops up, the
economy jumps upwards to reach the saddle path of the bubbly steady state. Investment
booms, the interest rate increases and the bubble gradually decreases as the economy con-
verges to the bubbly steady state. More generally, the following proposition summarizes
the eﬀects of a bubble:
Proposition 2 Assume that (B) holds. For any it0−1, there exists a maximum feasible
bubble ¯ b(it0−1). The path of productions/investments {it}t≥t0 and interest rates {rt}t≥t0
are increasing in the size of the original bubble bt0.F o rbt0 < ¯ b(it0−1), the economy is
asymptotically bubbleless: it converges to the bubbleless steady state. For bt0 = ¯ b(it0−1),








Figure 2: Phase diagram when consumer sector is a net borrower
Corollary 1 The condition for a bubble to exist (B) is equivalent to r∗ <n .
19Proof. Note that (B) amounts to saying that bb intersects bi at a point where bt >0 .
Note further that the interest rate at the intersection of the two schedules is always equal
to n.S i n c et h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei si n c r e a s i n gi nit−1 and bt, r∗ is less than n if and only if
(B) holds.
Proposition 3 Assume that (B) holds. On an asymptotically bubbly path, the bubble
(i) decreases with the fraction of income that is pledgeable (ρ0); indeed a bubble can exist
if and only if the pledgeable income is smaller than a threshold;
(ii) decreases with the number of existing stores of value ( l ).
3.2 Collateral heterogeneity
We have assumed for convenience that ﬁrms are homogenous (perhaps up to a scaling
factor). When ﬁrms diﬀer, say, in the pledgeability of their income, those with limited
access to unsophisticated investors, i.e., low ρ0 ﬁrms (family ﬁrms, private equity, star-
tups), beneﬁt relatively more from the presence of a bubble: They enjoy the liquidity
eﬀect without being much impacted by the competition eﬀect as they do not resort much
to small investors’ money.
In fact, let k be an index for ﬁrms and let ρk
0 be an increasing function of k. We
can assume wihtout loss of generality that k is distributed uniformly on [0,1]. We then
have the following aggregation result. The economy is described by two state variables:











t−1dk and rt+1 are jointly determined as the intersection of








































































[A(1 + n)+( 1 − θ)l] − l
r
∗∗ = n.
The condition for a bubble to exist is now given by











The analysis of the dynamics of the economy are exactly as in Section 3.1.
Replacing the representative ﬁrm’s pledged income by the industry-average pledged
income, we see that the previous analysis generalizes to heterogenous ﬁrms. Hence the
investment ik
t of ﬁrms with lower pledgeable income ρk
0 increases relatively more with the
































is decreasing in k.
Proposition 4 Assume that (Bk) holds. Then:











21The path of productions/investments {it}t≥t0 and interest rates {rt}t≥t0 are increasing in the






, the economy is asymptotically







economy is asymptotically bubbly: it converges to the bubbly steady state.





is decreasing in k.
3.3 Tests for bubbles and dynamic eﬃciency
Dynamic eﬃciency: Abel et al’s test versus interest rate tests. Abel et al’s (1989)
test of dynamic eﬃciency involves comparing the value of resources used for investment
every period to the value of resources produced. It is believed to be superior to an interest
rate test involving a comparison of the interest rate ˜ r and the growth rate nsince it is
hard in practice to determine which interest rate to use in this comparison. We will see
that in our model, ˜ r<ndoes not necessarily imply that the economy is dynamically
ineﬃcient.
Consider a steady state, with or without bubbles, where investment and interest rates
are given by ˜ ı and ˜ r. In steady state, resources being used for investment in period t, or
equivalently the total wealth of generation t at birth, normalized by the population of
generation t−1 are A(1+n)+(1−θ)l(1 + n)/(1 +˜ r). In steady state, resources being
produced from investment in period t, normalized by the population of generation t are
ρ1˜ ı/(1 + n)+l. Hence Abel et al’s criterion tests whether or not
ρ1˜ ı
1 + n














∗ − n) >0 (DE)
H e n c ew ec a nh a v er∗ <nand still Abel et al’s test accepting dynamic eﬃciency (DE).
Note, further, that if all output were pledgeable and therefore the rate of return were equal
for internal and external funds (ρ0 = ρ1), then (DE) would boil down to the standard
comparison between the rate of interest and the rate of growth.
Bubbles and dynamic eﬃciency. We are interested in the predictive content of dy-
22namic eﬃciency tests for the presence or the possibility of bubbles. In the standard model
of Tirole (1985), bubbles can arise only if the bubbless steady state is dynamically ineﬃ-
cient. In that case the bubbly steady state is dynamically eﬃcient and all asymptotically
non bubbly paths are dynamically ineﬃcient. Therefore, if the actual economy is found
to be dynamically ineﬃcient, bubbles are possible. If on the other hand the economy is
dynamically eﬃcient, then either bubbles are impossible or we are on an asymptotically
bubbly path. Moreover, dynamic eﬃciency can be assessed by judging whether or not
r∗ >n .
In our model, the link between bubbles and dynamic eﬃciency is considerably weak-
ened. The possibility of bubbles — i.e. (B) — is consistent with the bubbleless steady
state being either dynamically eﬃcient or ineﬃcient. The possibility of bubbles is still
determined however, by the interest rate test r∗ <n .In addition, our model sheds some
light as to whch interest rate to use in this test: the rate that should be used corresponds
to an "uninformed" interest rate — a relatively low interest rate. Thus the considerations
brought about by our analysis go part of the way towards rehabilitating interest rate tests
as an indication for the possibility of bubbles.
Bubbleless steady state. Let us ﬁrst consider the bubbleless steady state. We know
that (B) is equivalent to r∗ <n . Hence if (B) doesn’t hold, then the bubbleless steady
state is dynamically eﬃcient. Dynamic eﬃciency of the bubbleless steady state, however,
is consistent with (B) and therefore does not preclude the existence of a bubbly steady
state. 7

















ρ1 + ρ0 >1+ n (7)
Similarly, one can see that (B) reduces to
2ρ0 <1+ n
23We can rewrite the condition for dynamic eﬃciency as
[A(1 + r








I ta p p e a r st h a ti fr∗−n
1+r∗ +
ρ1−ρ0
ρ0 <0 , then the economy is clearly dynamically ineﬃcient.
Suppose that r∗ <n(otherwise the bubbleless steady state is dynamically eﬃcient): for
ag i v e nr∗ <n ,the condition for dynamic eﬃciency is more likely to be veriﬁed if ρ0
is smaller. However a smaller ρ0 also implies a lower r∗ which makes the condition for
dynamic eﬃciency less likely to be veriﬁed. The overall eﬀect of ρ0 is therefore ambiguous
when r∗ <n .W h e n ρ0 is high enough however, then r∗ ≥ n, and the economy is
dynamically eﬃcient.
Bubbly steady state. Let us now consider the bubbly steady state. The bubbly steady








Note that the right hand side is always negative since we have assumed that investors
prefer to invest rather than roll over their liquidity: ρ1 ≥ 1 + n. Therefore as in Tirole
(1985), the bubbly steady state is dynamically eﬃcient. In that sense, bubbles improve
the eﬃciency of the economy.
Pareto improvements. Bubbles need not generate Pareto improvements when the
economy is ineﬃcient. It turns out that when l = 0 a bubble given to the generation
about to invest (generation t at date t + 1) has absolutely no eﬀect on investment. The
interest rate increases up to the point where the equity multiplier has decreased enough
to leave investment unaﬀected. A bubble given to consumers would ameliorate the short
run and deteriorate the long run. More generally, we saw that the bubble always (weakly)
increased investment. It cannot, therefore, generate a Pareto improvement: in the ﬁrst
period, less resources will be left for consumption.
Proposition 5 The higher rate of return on internal funds than on borrowed ones implies
that dynamic eﬃciency (in the sense of Abel et al) is consistent with bubbleless rates of
interest below the rate of growth of the economy, and with the existence of asymptotically
24bubbly paths. The possibility of bubbles is exactly determined by an (uninformed investor)
interest rate test of the form r∗ <n .
3.4 Consumers with positive net demand for stores of values
So far, we have assumed that consumers of generation t consume only at date t and are
therefore net suppliers of stores of values. We now assume that consumers have a positive
net demand for stores of value: θ <0 .
















The highest solution corresponds to the unique bubbleless steady state. The lowest
solution does not correspond to a valid steady state since it is associated with a negative
yield 1+r<0 . 8 Note that the bubbleless steady state is stable just as in the case θ >0 .
Note also that when θ <0 ,there are two intersections between the bi
t and bb
t schedules


















so that the bubbly steady state corresponds to the higher of the two solutions to the
equation in i : bi
t(i)=bb
t(i). Condition (8) is more likely to be veriﬁed, the lower the
level of rents l, the higher the level of pledgeable income ρ0 and the higher the net worth
8When θ <0 ,t h es y s t e mo fe q u a t i o n sd e ﬁning bubbleless steady states has two solutions, only one of











[A(1 + r∗) − θl]
25of entrepreneurs A.
When this condition is violated the bubbly steady state becomes unstable. The crucial
diﬀerence is that in this case, a perturbation of the bubbly steady state with db0 = 0
and di−1 <0leads to di0 <d i −1. Similarly, a perturbation with db0 = 0 and di−1 >0
leads to di0 >d i −1. Intuitively, there is so much net worth and so little collateral in
the economy that investment dynamics become unstable. There is a snowball eﬀect on
investment: more investment increases collateral which in turn increases investment even
more.
Proposition 6 Assume that (B) holds, that θ <0 , and that (8) holds. Then r∗ <nand
i∗∗ <i ∗. There exists i <i ∗∗ such that for any it0−1 ≥ i , there exists a maximum feasible
bubble ¯ b(it0−1). Investment decreases with the size of the bubble. For bt0 < ¯ b(it0−1),
the economy is asymptotically bubbleless: it converges to the bubbleless steady state. For
bt0 = ¯ b(it0−1), the economy is asymptotically bubbly: it converges to the bubbly steady
state.
Bubbles increase the interest rate and induce a transfer from borrowers to lenders.
When θ >0 ,the non-corporate sector is a net borrower. The bubble then operates a
transfer from the non-corporate sector to the corporate sector, which increases investment.
Bubbles and investment are complements.W h e nθ <0 ,the opposite happens and bubbles








Figure 3: Phase diagram when consumer sector is net lender
263.5 Governance
A key theme in corporate ﬁnance is that ﬁrms can boost pledgeable income (ρ0)a tt h e
cost of a sacriﬁce in value (ρ1).9 For example, they can pledge more collateral, creating
moral hazard, monitoring costs and reduced ﬂexibility; they can enlist a private monitor
(venture capitalist, large shareholder, bank); or they can abandon private equity for a
public listing, at the cost of transparency obligations, reduced incentives and so forth.
The trade-oﬀ between pledgeable income and value can be formalized by a decreasing
function (ρ1 = H(ρ0)).
Let ρt
1 and ρt

















Thus, when liquidity is scarce (the interest rate is low), ﬁrms will sacriﬁce value in order
to boost pledgeable income.
To avoid re-analyzing the complete path, let us assume that governance choices are
made “at the margin” and so the paths described in Propositions 1 and 2 are approxima-
tions of the realized paths with endogenous governance. The optimal governance choice









Proposition 7 A bubble, by increasing interest rates, reduces the beneﬁts of creating
pledgeable income. It is therefore conducive to looser governance (lower ρt
0,h i g h e rρt
1).
4 Stochastic bubbles
4.1 Bubbly liquidity discount
As in Weil (1987), we can allow the bubble to burst stochastically. Supose that each
period the bubble bursts with probability 1 − λ.
9See, e.g., Tirole (2006) for an overview.
27An asset’s liquidity service depends on what the asset delivers when cash is particularly
valuable to ﬁrms. Building on this idea,10 we now argue that, even in this risk neutral,
constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) environment, a stochastic bubble trades at a liquidity
discount (or equivalently in this model an equity premium) relative to rents.
Let r∗(it) denote the interest rate prevailing on the bubbleless path for “initial” in-
vestment it; this function was derived in Section 2.2: r∗(it)=A−1 ¡ ρ0
1+nit + θl
¢
− 1.L e t
it and rt+1 (respectively, i−
t and r∗(i−
t )) denote the investment levels and interest rates
when the bubble has lasted until period t+1 and continues (respectively, bursts). These
are given by:
it =



























t ) are determined by the same set of equations as it and rt+1 but
with bt = 0, it is clear that it >i −
t and rt+1 >r ∗(i−
t ): the burst of the bubble depresses
investment and the interest rate.
At date t, generation-t entrepreneurs can hold safe assets (rents, claims on previous
investments’ income) or risky ones (stochastic bubble). Letting e rt denote the return on


















This in turn implies that 1 +e rt > (1 + rt)/λ. Despite risk neutrality and CRS, sto-
chastic bubbles trade at a positive discount (1+rt)−1−λ
−1 (1 +e rt)
−1— alternatively, they
command positive net expected returns λ(1 +e rt)−(1 + rt). The intuition is straightfor-
ward. Bubbles deliver no income when liquidity is scarce and so the interest rate is low,
implying that internal funds can be levered substantially.
A steady state along the bubbly path is given by e r∗∗ = n and
10Which is but the transposition on the production side of standard (CAPM) principles on the con-
sumption side (see e.g., Holmström-Tirole 2001).


































Unfortunately, this condition determines only implicitely the parameter region that
leads to the possibility of bubbles. It features two endogenous objects, i∗∗ and r∗∗ that are
the solutions to the non-linear system of equations above. This complication arises for the
following reason. Bubbles now present a risk premium and thus a positive net expected
return: λ(1+˜ r∗∗)−(1+r∗∗) >0 .In a bubbly steady state, zero per capita bubble growth
pins down the expected return on bubbles: λ(1+˜ r∗∗)=n; both the risk-free rate r∗∗ and
investment i∗∗ have to be determined jointly as solutions to a non-linear system.
Steady state investment i∗∗, bubble size b∗∗ and interest rate r∗∗ are all decreasing in
the probability that the bubble crashes 1−λ. Am o r es t a b l eb u b b l ep r o v i d e sm o r el i q u i d i t y
and is more conducive to investment. This in turn boosts the demand for liquidity and
makes for a larger bubble.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the consumer sector is a net borrower (θ >0 ) and that (B”)
holds, then: (i) bubbles trade at a liquidity discount; (ii) in steady state along the bubbly
path — before the bubble bursts — as, the probability of bursting (1−λ) increases, investment
i∗∗ and bubble b∗∗ decrease; (iii) as long as the bubble lasts, investment is high and interest
rates are high; (iv) when the bubble bursts, investment immediately decreases and keeps
decreasing until we reach the bubbleless steady state; (v) the bursting of the bubble makes
collateral more valuable: ﬁrms scramble for collateral.
The dynamics when the bubble still lasts are more complicated. Indeed, an extra
state variable is now required to describe the economy. The state space is now given by
29the triple (it−1,b t,r t). The reason past interest rates rt have to be kept track of is that
the arbitrage equation (9) involves both the interest rate at date t and at date t + 1. As
a consequence, phase diagrams cannot be used anymore. A full characterization of the
stability properties of the diﬀerent steady states and their basin of attraction is rather
involved and outside the scope of this paper.
4.2 Bubbles bursting endogenously
We now modify the environment in the following way. Suppose that A follows a two-
state Markov process A ∈ {AH,A L} with AH >A L. Initially A = AH. With probability
1 − λ >0per period, A transitions to AL w h i c hi sa na b s o r b i n gs t a t e .
We assume that (B”) is veriﬁed for an exogenous bursting probability of (1 − λ) in
an economy with a deterministic and constant A equal to AH. Similarly, we assume that
for any λ ∈ [0,1], (B”) is violated for an exogenous bursting probability of (1 − λ) in
an economy with a deterministic and constant A equal to AL. Hence if the economy is
already in the state of low net worth A = AL, the demand for liquidity is low, the interest
rate is high and bubbles cannot exist. Bubbles however, can exist as long as net worth is
high: A = AH. For notation simplicity, we keep the notation r∗(it) for the interest rate
prevailing on the bubbleless path for “initial” investment it when A = AL.11
Suppose that At = AH and consider the economy entering period t+1 with a bubble
of size bt and a capital stock given by it−1. Then if At+1 = AH, (bt+1,i t) are given by the
same equations as in Section 4.2.1 with A = AH . On the other hand if At+1 = AL, then
the bubble bursts: bt = 0 and it is given by the same equations as above with A = AL
and bt = 0. The economy then evolves as in Section 2.2.
Proposition 9 Assume that θ >0and that (B”) holds with A = AH.C o n s i d e r a n
economy where in the initial period the economy is in steady state along the bubbly path
and At = AH. In the ﬁrst period where At = AL, the bubble bursts, investment drops, and
the economy converges to the bubbleless steady state corresponding to A = AL.









30This environment makes clear that bad shocks to corporate balance sheets can poten-
tially have an ampliﬁed eﬀect on investment over and above that described in the literature
emphasizing the importance of corporate net worth — for example Kiyotaki-Moore (1997)
— by triggering liquidity dry-ups in the form of bubble bursts.
5R o b u s t n e s s
5.1 Concave preferences and unconstrained ﬁrms
In this section, we adopt the setup where consumers have concave preferences as in Section
2.4.1 and generalize our comparative statics results to that case. Note that the model with
unconstrained ﬁrms described in Section 2.4.1 is nested by the model where consumers
have concave preferences. The analysis below therefore also applies to the setup with
unconstrained ﬁrms (see the remark below).
Let L be the endowment of rents per entrepreneur. Both the level of rents and the
fraction of rents in the hands of consumers now depends on the interest rate. The supply














The steady analysis, however, remains very tractable. In a bubbly steady state
i
∗∗ =












− l(n) − L
r
∗∗ = n
Note that investment in a steady state with bubbles is independent of the function l(rt).12
There is perfect crowding out between bubbles and rents created by consumers: b∗∗+l(n)
is independent of the function l(rt).
By contrast, as we already noted, rents in the hands of entrepreneurs L increase
12In particular, some of the microfoundations we provided for rents led to a similar decreasing function
l(rt).The analysis that is conducted in this section applies to these cases as well.
31entrepreneurs’ net worth and hence investment. As a result, they do not completely
crowd out bubbles: b∗∗ + L is increasing in L.
The condition for the bubbly steady state becomes







− l(n) >0 (B’)
Proposition 10 Suppose that (B’) holds. Then r∗ <n .
(i) If l(r∗) >0 , investment in the bubbly steady state i∗∗ is higher than investment i∗ in
t h en o n - b u b b l ys t e a d ys t a t e .











, investment in the bubbly steady state i∗∗ is
lower than investment i∗ in the non-bubbly steady state.
Therefore, we verify once again that bubbles crowd investment in as long as consumers
are net suppliers of rents. The assumption that l(r∗) >0is crucial to determine whether
bubbles are complements or substitutes. Bubbles raise the interest rate and transfer
wealth from borrowers to lenders. When l(r∗) >0 ,consumers are borrowers. The bubble
then operates a transfer from consumers to entrepreneurs, which increases investment.
Bubbles and rents are complements. When l(r∗) <0 ,the opposite happens and bubbles
crowd investment out. Bubbles and rents are then substitutes.
Remark:N o t et h a tt h i sa n a l y s i sn e s t st h em o d e lw i t hu n c o n s t r a i n e dﬁrms described in
Section 2.4.1. In that model, we have l(r∗)=f(k∗) >0 . Proposition 10 then shows that
i∗∗ >i ∗. However, note that the steady state investment level for unconstrained ﬁrms in
a bubbly steady-state is lower than in the non-bubbly steady state: k∗∗ <k ∗. This is
the standard crowding out eﬀect of bubbles on investment. Therefore, bubbles crowd the
investment of constrained ﬁrms in i∗∗ >i ∗ but crowds the investment of unconstrained
ﬁrms out k∗∗ <k ∗.
5.2 Consumers with linear preferences
We now examine the case where consumers are able to substitute present consumption for
future consumption with a per-period discount factor β. There are two cases to consider.
If β(1 + rt+1) <1 ,then the dynamics are characterized by the same equations we have
32b e e nu s i n gs of a r :e q u a t i o n s( 5 )a n d( 6 ) .I fβ(1 + rt+1) ≥ 1, on the other hand, then the
analysis has to be modiﬁed as consumers will hold on to at least part of their endowment
of rents. We will assume that β(1+n) <1 ,so that the bubbly steady state characterized
above exists. Appendix A3 characterizes the dynamics of the economy and the phase









i∗ bubbly steady state
i∗∗ =





A/β +( 1− θ) 
1 − βρ0
Figure 4: Phase diagram with linear consumer preferences
Proposition 11 Suppose that consumers have linear preferences with discount factor β,
that (B) holds and that β(1 + n) <1 . Suppose further that liquidity initially is plenti-
ful due to previous investment (it−1 high). The economy evolves through three consecutive
phases. First, consumers do not sell their rents, which yield high interest rates; investment
decreases; the bubble increases and then decreases. Second, investment remains constant,
consumers sell some of their rents and the bubble increases. Finally, consumers sell all
their rents and the bubble increases and investment decreases to the steady state, as de-
scribed in Proposition 2.
5.3 Producers with linear preferences
Finally, we assumed for convenience that entrepreneurs consume only when old. Suppose
by contrast that they have linear preferences, with discount factor β.F o c u so nt h er e g i o n
33in which
it−1 <
A/β +( 1 − θ)l
1 − βρ0
for which we know from the previous analysis that consumers would not want to compete
with ﬁrms for stores of value; neither would the entrepreneurs want to save unless those
savings are used for future investment.
We need to check that entrepreneurs prefer investing in stores of value and then in
productive investment to consuming when young:
β












2(1 + rt)] (10)
Condition (10), which ensures that our analysis extends to producers with linear prefer-
ences, is easier to satisfy when ρ1 a n d( g i v e nt h a tβ(1 + rt) and β(1 + rt+1) are smaller
than 1) ρ0 increase.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has made several contributions.
First, we have studied the interplay between inside liquidity and outside liquidity
(stores of value). Outside liquidity helps ﬁrms address the asynchronicity between their
access to and need for cash — the liquidity eﬀect— but also compete for savings with
productive investment — the competition eﬀect. The liquidity eﬀect dominates when
inside liquidity is abundant, and when outisde liquidity is outside of an intermediate
region.
Second, we have shown that bubbles are more likely to exist and can be larger when
inside and outside liquidity are scarce. Dynamic eﬃciency is consistent with the existence
of bubbles, provided that the rate of return on internal funds exceeds that on borrowed
ones, i.e. provided that capital markets are imperfect.
34Third, bubbles are a form of outside liquidity. They crowd the ﬁnancially con-
strained corporate sector’s investment in (out) if the unconstrained sector is a net bor-
rower (lender). The burst of a bubble has a negative ﬁnancial wealth eﬀect on ﬁrms, and
further reduces liquidity. The former eﬀect is contractionary, and so is the latter if the
unconstrained sector is a net borrower. Conversely, permanent real wealth losses by ﬁrms
make it harder to sustain a bubble, and so ﬁnancial disturbances amplify real ones. Even
in a risk neutral, constant-returns-to-scale environment, a stochastic bubble trades at a
liquidity discount relative to rents since it pays more in states where the equity multiplier
is low. Finally, bubbles impact other corporate decisions as well. In particular, ﬁrms are
predicted to strengthen their governance in periods of scarce liquidity, as when a bubble
has burst.
Our analysis brings support to the idea that pricking bubbles may be hazardous. But
it also suggests when this will be particularly so, namely when the unconstrained sector
is a net borrower. To go further, though, one w i l ln e e dt on o to n l ya n a l y z et h ei m p a c to f
the popping up of the bubble, but also the way it is performed, for example a sustained
increase in the interest rate or an increase in the supply of public liquidity, which provided
that it is not matched by an equivalent reduction in consumer’s supply of liquidity will
hamper the continuation of the bubble. Extending the microfoundations of Section 2.4.1
and adding a public supply of liquidity should therefore stand high on our research agenda.
Our imperfect capital-markets analysis implies a divergence between the rates of re-
turns on internal and borrowed funds, and therefore that rates of return on borrowed
funds below the rate of growth of the economy are consistent with Abel et al (1989)’s
ﬁnding that the productive sector may disgorge at least as much as it invests. The out-
ﬂow measure in Abel et al aggregates a variety of ﬁrms with wildly diﬀerent governance
structures and therefore pledgeable income (publicly traded ﬁrms, family and private eq-
uity, startups). Using the theoretical analysis to build a modiﬁed version of Abel et al’s
clever test of potential existence of bubbles would be of much interest as well.
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A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Derivation of investment i∗ in the bubbleless steady state. We have
i
∗=
































Proof of Lemma 1. We can solve for investment it as a function of it−1 and bt :
it=
(1 + n)A +
ρ0it−1
1+n +[ 1 −
θ(1+n)
ρ0 ]l+ r­
(1 + n)A +
ρ0it−1










From this expression, it is clear that it is increasing in it−1 and bt.















which can be solved for as
i
∗ =


















































































































































≥ 0, then clearly ∂i∗






≤ 0. The condition that ∂i∗
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This deﬁnes the schedule as a function bt of it−1: bi
t(it−1).
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which can be positive or negative.



















































θl +( 1 − θ)l +
ρ0it−1
1+n +( 1 + n)A+ q
[−1+n
ρ0 θl − θl +( 1 − θ)l +
ρ0it−1
1+n +( 1 + n)A]2 + 41+n
ρ0 θl[(1 + n)A − bt]
2
Hence it is increasing in it−1 and decreasing in bt. Note that we have
˜ b
b(it−1) ≥ ˜ b
i(it−1)






























[A(1 + n)+( 1 − θ)l] ≥ 0
i fa n do n l yi fit−1 / ∈ [i2,i 1] where
i1 =











and (8) guarantees that i2 <i 1. A phase diagram analysis shows that the bubbly steady state
is saddle path stable, and the results in the proposition follow.
A.3 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 10. The proof proceeds as follows. Consider the economy where rents
supplied by consumers are ﬁxed and equal to l(r∗). We can use the phase diagram derived above
to analyze this economy. At the intersection of bi
t and bb













− l(r∗) − L (possibly negative) and the
interest rate is equal to n. Therefore
g(i
∗∗, ˜ b








is increasing in i and b. It is then easy to see that this implies i∗∗ >i ∗
if and only if r∗ <n ,and that this last condition is equivalent to ˜ b∗∗ >0 .If we had r∗ >n ,
then we would have l(r∗) <l (n) which combined with ˜ b∗∗ <0is in contradiction with (B’).
The second part of the proposition can be proved along the same lines.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1 .Suppose then that β(1 + rt+1) >1 .In that case, consumers do
not sell their rents. The supply and demand equations become:
it =
















43As i m p l i ﬁcation occurs which allows us to solve for the dynamics in closed form:




1 + rt+1 = ρ0
A(1 + n)+( 1 − θ)l + ρ0
it−1
1+n
A(1 + n) − bt
The it = it−1 schedule is given by
it−1 =




This deﬁnes a vertical schedule ˜ bi.












− (1 − θ)l
which deﬁnes a schedule ˜ bb
t(it−1).







[A(1 + n)+( 1 − θ)l] − (1 − θ)l It is easy to check that we
always have ˜ bb
t(it−1) >b b
t(it−1). In Figure 2, ˜ bb
t(it−1) is represented by the dotted red line.
It is remarkable that the bubble bt has absolutely no impact on investment. The bubble raises
the interest rate and decreases the value of rents: bubbly liquidity perfectly crowds out private
liquidity.
When β(1+rt+1) <1and consumers sell their stores of values to entrepreneurs, the appari-
tion of the bubble raises interest rates, lowers the value of their endowment of rents, and triggers
a net transfer of wealth from consumers to entrepreneurs. This in turn boosts investment. When
β(1+rt+1) >1 ,this transfer mechanism is not operative — because consumers hold on to their
rents — and there is perfect crowding out.
We still have to tackle the case where β(1+rt+1)=1. In that case, consumers are indiﬀerent
between holding on to their rents or selling them. In period t +1, they will only sell a fraction















Note that in this region, the evolution of bt is exogenous. We can solve the system using
state variables (it−1,b t,x t) as:
it =


















Several cases have to be considered depending on whether β(1+rt) >1or β(1+rt)=1.
If β(1 + rt)=1 for example, then it = i∗∗∗ where
i
∗∗∗ =
(1 − θ)l + A
β
1 − βρ0
If β(1 + rt) >1 ,then xt = 1, and xt+1 and it can be inferred from (15) and (13):
xt+1 =












In order to trace the phase diagram, it is important to determine the relative positions of











−1 +( 1 − θ)l
1 − βρ0
45Note that β < 1
1+n. Consider the following function over the interval [0, 1
1+n]
H(x) ≡
Ax−1 +( 1 − θ)l
1 − xρ0










−Ax−2 (1 − xρ0)+ρ0
£














−1 + ρ0(1 − θ)l
¤
= 2Ax
−3 (1 − ρ0x) >0




−1 + ρ0(1 − θ)l ≤ −A(1 + n)
2 + 2Aρ0(1 + n)+ρ0(1 − θ)l
We now use condition (B):
1 + n − 2ρ0
1 + n − ρ0
≥
l
(1 − θ)l + A(1 + n)
This implies the weaker condition
1 + n − 2ρ0
1 + n − ρ0
≥
(1 − θ)l
(1 − θ)l + A(1 + n)
which we can rewrite as
(1 + n − 2ρ0)A(1 + n) ≥ ρ0(1 − θ)l
or equivalently
−A(1 + n)
2 + 2Aρ0(1 + n)+ρ0(1 − θ)l ≤ 0
46This proves that for all x ∈ [0, 1
1+n],H 0(x) ≤ 0. Hence
i
∗∗∗ = H(β) >H
µ
1
1 + n
¶
= i
∗∗
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